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INTRODUCTION 
Every day, Facebook, Twitter, Google, Amazon, ridesharing 
companies, and numerous other service providers copy users’ account 
information upon receiving a preservation request from the government. 
These requests are authorized under a relatively obscure subsection of the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA). The SCA is the federal statute that 
governs the disclosure of communications stored by third party service 
providers. Section 2703(f) of this statute authorizes the use of “f” or 
“preservation” letters, which enable the government to request that a 
service provider “take all necessary steps to preserve records and other 
evidence in its possession” while investigators seek valid legal process.1 
Section 2703(f) is clearly a valuable tool for law enforcement, and 
one that investigators are loath to give up. According to the government, 
it permits investigators to prevent the destruction of evidence in a 
minimally intrusive way while seeking legal process.2 It is also a useful 
means to obtain evidence because relying on § 2703(f) does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment as it does not involve government action. Even if the 
use of “f” letters does implicate the Fourth Amendment, the preservation 
 
 1. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1). 
 2. See OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING 
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 27 (Nathan 
Judish et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Manual]. 
2020] Preservation Requests and the Fourth Amendment 107 
 
of account information is reasonable because users have consented to the 
preservation of their records through their acceptance of the service 
provider’s Terms of Service. 
Despite its legality, § 2703(f) is harmful to user privacy. Privacy 
advocates argue that the provision is outdated, it is relied upon excessively 
by investigators, and it circumvents privacy protections by avoiding 
judicial oversight. The provision is textually inconsistent. Critics of 
§ 2703(f) argue that it violates the Fourth Amendment because it lacks 
traditional safeguards and because the preservation of account information 
is an unreasonable seizure. 
This Article aims to impartially present and evaluate both the 
benefits and harms of using “f” letters as a law enforcement tool. Part I 
provides the background of the SCA and places the statute in historical 
context. Part II surveys various service providers’ Terms of Service and 
Privacy Policies and provides statistics regarding the use of preservation 
letters. Part III analyzes both the benefits and harms resulting from the 
government’s use of “f” letters. Finally, Part IV suggests a remedy that 
enables investigators to continue using “f” letters when appropriate while 
also limiting the privacy harms that can occur under the existing process. 
I. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
A. Erections, Warshak, and the Stored Communications Act 
United States v. Warshak3 was the first case to pose a constitutional 
challenge to the Stored Communications Act, and it illustrates the 
conflicting interests of law enforcement and individual privacy.4 The 
statutory privacy law regulates the voluntary and compelled disclosures of 
stored content and non-content information held by third party service 
providers.5 In this case the government was investigating Steven 
Warshak’s company, Berkeley, for fraud. Berkeley’s principal product 
was Enzyte, a pill purported to increase the size of a man’s penis.6 
 
 3. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 4. Susan Freiwald & Patricia L. Bellia, The Fourth Amendment Status of Stored E-Mail: The 
Law Professors’ Brief in Warshak v. United States, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 560 (2007). As Freiwald 
and Bellia show in their insightful article, United States v. Warshak was a particularly important 
decision in the development of electronic surveillance law because it involved a balancing of interests 
between a user’s right to privacy in his stored electronic communications and the government’s 
interest in gaining access to such information in order to pursue and prosecute a potential criminal. 
Through its decision, the Sixth Circuit addressed not only the procedural hurdles that law enforcement 
agents must overcome in order to obtain access to a user’s electronic information under the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) but also whether the SCA’s requirements satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
 5. Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11. 
 6. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 276. 
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Berkeley advertised aggressively through suggestive commercials 
featuring “Smilin’ Bob” and “a very happy missis at home.”7 The 
advertisement campaign, which claimed that individuals who took the pill 
“experienced a 12 to 31% increase in the size of their penises,” cited an 
independent customer study later confirmed to be fake.8 In addition, the 
company falsified other statistics, enrolled customers in an auto-ship 
program without their consent, and artificially inflated the number of its 
sales transactions to maintain lines of credit from merchant banks.9 These 
questionable corporate practices eventually caught the attention of 
government regulators and investigators. 
Because Berkeley personnel relied on e-mail for communication, in 
October 2004 the government requested Warshak’s Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) to preserve the contents of Warshak’s e-mails, as well as 
all future messages.10 The service provider began preserving copies of 
Warshak’s incoming and outgoing e-mails, and per the government’s 
instructions, Warshak was not informed that his communications were 
being preserved.11 In January 2005, the government obtained a subpoena 
pursuant to § 2703(b) and compelled Warshak’s ISP to disclose all the  
e-mails it had preserved since receiving the preservation request.12 The 
government served Warshak’s ISP with an ex parte § 2703(d) order in May 
2005 and mandated that the ISP turn over additional e-mails in Warshak’s 
account.13 In total, the government obtained the contents of approximately 
27,000 e-mails from Warshak’s account.14 Warshak eventually received 
notice of the subpoena and §2703(d) order in May 2006.15 
Seeking to exclude the e-mails the government obtained from his 
ISP, Warshak argued that the government had violated § 2703(f) by 
engaging in the prospective preservation of his e-mails and that the 
evidence should be suppressed.16 The Sixth Circuit held that Warshak had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mails and that the government 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by compelling his ISP to disclose 
his e-mails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.17 
 
 7. Id. at 277; see also Associated Press, Company Touts Pills for Middle-Age Ailments, NBC 
NEWS (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6513891#.XfAsDZNKjq0 [https://perma. 
cc/T8WR-2UT4]. 
 8. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 277. 
 9. Id. at 271–81. 
 10. Id. at 283. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 335. 
 17. Id. at 288. 
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Yet, the court sidestepped addressing the issue surrounding “f” letters by 
holding that the e-mails should not be excluded from evidence due to the 
government’s good faith reliance on the SCA.18 This decision has rightly 
been recognized for extending Fourth Amendment protections to e-mails, 
as well as for its implications for online privacy. To date, however, 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) scholars have largely 
ignored the concurring opinion’s discussion of § 2703(f), the statutory 
provision that the government used to preserve Warshak’s e-mails in the 
first place. The concurrence was the first to recognize and discuss the 
privacy issues that could arise from improper use of § 2703(f). 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Keith expressed his apprehension 
regarding the government’s use of § 2703(f) to “preserve Warshak’s 
stored and future e-mail communications without Warshak’s knowledge 
and without a warrant.”19 According to Judge Keith, “The plain language 
of § 2703(f) permits only the preservation of e-mails in the service 
provider’s possession at the time of the request, not the preservation of 
future e-mails.”20 Further, if the service provider had not been compelled 
by the preservation request to maintain all existing and prospective  
e-mails, and had followed its existing policy, it would have destroyed 
Warshak’s old e-mails in the ordinary course of business.21 But because 
the government relied on § 2703(f) to compel that the service provider 
preserve all of Warshak’s e-mails, “the government used the statute as a 
means to monitor Warshak after the investigation started without his 
knowledge and without a warrant.”22 Such conduct was troubling because 
it was akin to “back-door wiretapping.”23 Judge Keith’s chief concern was 
the government’s demand of prospective preservation and disclosure of  
e-mails under § 2703(f). And though the majority’s decision prohibited the 
government from using “f” letters to order service providers  
to preserve records not yet created, it did not adequately analyze the 
constitutionality of § 2703(f). 
The following section provides the historical background of the 
SCA. It also discusses 18 U.S.C. § 2703 and specifically focuses on the 
language of subsection (f). 
 
 18. Id. at 292. 
 19. Id. at 334 (Keith, J., concurring). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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B. Historical Context and Background 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution establishes “the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”24 While the “meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment is relatively well-established for investigations 
involving physical evidence,” the same cannot be said of searches and 
seizures involving digital evidence.25 Congress enacted the SCA in 1986, 
as part of the ECPA, after recognizing that the Fourth Amendment does 
not provide adequate protection to digital communications.26 The SCA’s 
purpose was to fill in some of the gaps created by technological 
developments and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that had combined, 
in the preceding two decades, to throw the then-existing state of privacy 
protections into a flux.27 
1. Searches and Seizures of Communications Prior to the Stored 
Communications Act 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.28 A “search” under the Fourth Amendment occurs in two 
situations: (1) a physical trespass, by the government, on to “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects;” or (2) action by the government that violates 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.29 A “seizure” involves 
“some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest in 
[her] property.”30 
To determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable, courts look 
to a two-prong test articulated by Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in 
the United States Supreme Court case, Katz v. United States.31 The Katz 
test asks (1) whether an individual has exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy, and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that 
subjective expectation as reasonable.32 If an individual has an actual 
expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable, 
and the government has violated this expectation through its conduct or 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25. ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 389 (4th ed. 2018). 
 26. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848; 
see KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 623. 
 27. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209–13 (2004). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 29. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 401. 
 30. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 32. Id.  
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due to its failure to obtain a warrant, then the government has likely 
violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.33 
The Supreme Court has clarified that the Fourth Amendment protects 
possessory and liberty interests even when privacy rights are not 
implicated.34 This Article limits its analysis to seizures that impact a user’s 
privacy and possessory interests. It will not discuss whether preservation 
requests involve “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
A seizure is constitutionally valid if it is accompanied by a warrant 
issued upon probable cause “supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things 
to be seized.”35 Although the Katz test remains the standard by which we 
analyze the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment seizures, the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in United States v. Miller36 and Smith v. Maryland37 
created the third-party doctrine that curtailed some of the protections 
created by Katz. 
In Miller, the government subpoenaed Mitch Miller’s bank records 
to use as evidence to prove he was engaged in criminal activity.38 Miller’s 
banks complied with the subpoena without notifying him.39 The 
government charged Miller based on the information it obtained from the 
banks, and Miller sought to suppress the evidence, arguing the records 
were obtained illegally and that his Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated.40 The Court held that a depositor does not have any expectation 
of privacy in his banking records because he is revealing the information 
to the bank in the ordinary course of business.41 
In Smith, the victim of a robbery began receiving threatening calls 
after she gave the police a description of the robber and his car, a Monte 
Carlo.42 After seeing the Monte Carlo drive past her house, she informed 
 
 33. There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In certain 
circumstances, a warrantless search or seizure may not be reasonable but will be deemed permissible 
if the conduct falls within one of the recognized exceptions. Common exceptions to the warrant 
requirement include (1) exigent circumstances, Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148–50 (2013); 
(2) consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); (3) a search incident to lawful 
arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969); (4) plain view, Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); and (5) the automobile exception, Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
 34. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 63–64 (1992). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 36. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 37. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 38. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437. 
 39. Id. at 438. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 440–43. 
 42. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
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the police.43 The police later spotted a man who met the description driving 
a Monte Carlo.44 The police ran a search on the car’s license plate number 
and discovered that the car was registered to Michael Smith.45 They asked 
his telephone company to use a pen register to record the numbers dialed 
from his home.46 When the pen register recorded a call from Smith’s house 
to the victim, the police obtained a warrant, searched Smith’s house, and 
discovered a phone book turned to a page with the name and number of 
the victim.47 Smith sought to suppress the evidence derived from the pen 
register.48 He argued that the police obtained the evidence without a 
warrant thereby violating his reasonable expectation of privacy.49 The 
Court disagreed with Smith.50 The majority held that Smith did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because even if he harbored a subjective 
expectation that the numbers he dialed would remain private, this 
expectation was not one that society would recognize as reasonable.51 The 
Court stated that in general, people recognize that they convey phone 
numbers to the telephone company in order to facilitate calls, and that the 
phone company makes permanent records of the numbers they dial for 
recordkeeping, billing, and other purposes.52 As such, “[a]lthough 
subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to 
believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any 
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”53 
Together, Miller and Smith established the third-party doctrine, 
which holds that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information they voluntarily reveal to third parties. The 
decisions also indicated that the Fourth Amendment did not provide 
sufficiently strong privacy protections in the context of third party records 
and, by extension, the networked environment. 
As the use of the Internet and e-mail communications increased, and 
as individuals provided more information in the form of data to service 
providers, it remained uncertain whether the Fourth Amendment applied 
in the context of computer networks.54 The concerns raised by the third-
party doctrine were further amplified because under the Fourth 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 738. 
 50. Id. at 742. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 743. 
 54. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 622–23. 
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Amendment’s private search doctrine, an ISP or other service provider 
(e.g., a telephone company) was authorized to search through the data in 
its possession and disclose the fruits to law enforcement.55  
In response, Congress passed the SCA to provide statutory privacy rights 
that supplement the constitutional rights of individuals as relating to 
searches and seizures. 
C. The Stored Communications Act 
In enacting the SCA, Congress sought to balance the privacy interests 
of society—recently undermined and diminished due to the  
third-party doctrine—with the legitimate needs of law enforcement to 
access such information.56 
The SCA is not intended to serve as a catch-all privacy statute; rather, 
it is narrowly tailored to regulate the retrospective surveillance of 
communications.57 The statute balances investigators’ needs against the 
privacy needs of individuals in two ways. First, the statute limits the 
government’s ability to compel service providers to disclose user 
information in their possession.58 Second, the statute limits the providers’ 
ability to voluntarily disclose user information to the government.59 
Section 2703 regulates the former,60 while Section 2702 regulates the 
latter.61 Though the SCA has other important sections that define the 
relevant terms,62 regulate delayed notice,63 or establish remedies,64 this 
Article will focus primarily on § 2703. Specifically, it will explore and 
analyze § 2703(f), the subsection of the SCA authorizing the issuance of 
“preservation letters” or “f” letters. 
1. Required Disclosure of Customer Communications or Records 
Section 2703 establishes the rules that the government must follow 
in order to compel a service provider to disclose customer communications 
or records. The SCA differentiates between electronic communication 
service providers (ECS) and remote computing service providers (RCS). 
An ECS is defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the 
 
 55. See Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 27, at 1212. 
 56. See id. at 1214. 
 57. See id. 
 58. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 676. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 2702. 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 2711. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 2705. 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 2708. 
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ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”65 And a 
RCS is defined as “the provision to the public of computer storage or 
processing services by means of an electronic communications system.”66 
These are the two types of providers regulated by the SCA. When the 
government seeks to compel either an ECS or a RCS to disclose customer 
communications or records, it must satisfy different legal standards 
depending on whether it is seeking non-content or content information. 
Broadly speaking, non-content information refers to records or other 
information pertaining to a customer or subscriber.67 Non-content 
information includes transactional records, such as network and telephone 
logs,68 cell site location information (CSLI),69 and e-mail addresses of 
individuals with whom the customer has corresponded.70 The government 
may gain access to this category of information either by obtaining 
customer consent, a court order based on specific and articulable facts, 
also known as a “2703(d) order” or simply “d” order, or a search warrant.71 
A subcategory of non-content information, which has been deemed 
less private and thus afforded less protection, is referred to as Basic 
Subscriber Information (BSI).72 Because BSI is the least protected 
category of information, the government may compel the disclosure of BSI 
through an administrative, grand jury, or trial subpoena.73 BSI was 
separated from other non-content records in the 1994 amendments to 
§ 2703(c). The legislative history of the amendments indicates that the 
purpose of the separation was to distinguish non-content information from 
more revealing transactional information that could contain a “person’s 
entire on-line profile.”74 BSI includes the subscriber’s name; address; 
telephone connection records or session times and duration; length of 
service and the types of service utilized; telephone or instrument number, 
subscriber number, or other identity, including any temporarily assigned 
network address; and means and source of payment for such a device 
(including credit card or bank account number).75 According to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), “[i]n the Internet context, ‘any temporarily 
assigned network address’ includes the IP address used by a customer for 
 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). 
 67. This Article will use the terms “customer,” “subscriber,” and “user” interchangeably. 
 68. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 680; DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 121. 
 69. See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 607, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 70. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 121. 
 71. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 680. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). 
 74. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 122; H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 17, 31–32 (1994), reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3497, 3511–12. 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)(A)–(F). 
2020] Preservation Requests and the Fourth Amendment 115 
 
a particular session. For example, for a webmail service, the IP address 
used by a customer accessing her email account constitutes a ‘temporarily 
assigned network address.’”76 
In contrast, content information concerns the substance of the 
communication and encompasses the actual files or data on the account. 
Contents, “when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, include any information concerning the substance, 
purport, or meaning of that communication.”77 For instance, the content of 
a text message is the actual text message; similarly, the body of an e-mail, 
the subject lines of an e-mail, or a voicemail all constitute “content.”78 
Content information is provided a higher degree of protection than non-
content information. To compel the disclosure of content information, the 
government must obtain a search warrant or provide user notice in 
combination with either (1) a subpoena or (2) a “2703(d) order.”79 
In some instances, law enforcement may want to compel a service 
provider to disclose certain information from a user’s account yet lack a 
search warrant, “d” order, subpoena, or other valid legal process. Under 
such circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) permits the investigators to direct 
a service provider to preserve the records and other evidence related to the 
account for ninety days, and potentially up to one hundred eighty days, 
pending the issuance of valid and compulsory legal process.80 
2. Preservation Requests and Section 2703(f) 
Section 2703(f)(1) of the SCA states that a provider of ECS or RCS 
“upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps 
to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the 
issuance of a court order or other process.”81 Such records and other 
evidence may “be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall be extended 
for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the 
governmental entity.”82 
As has been noted by Professor Kerr, the language of this provision 
is odd for several reasons: it contains both mandatory and permissive 
language; and perhaps more importantly, it uses the term “records and 
 
 76. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 121. 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
 78. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 123. 
 79. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 679; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
 80. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 129. 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(2). 
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other evidence,” which is broader than “non-content information.”83 This 
ambiguity leaves open the question of whether the government can 
demand that a service provider preserve both content and non-content 
information, or whether preservation requests apply only to non-content 
information or metadata. In practice, most service providers who are 
recipients of “f” letters preserve both the content and non-content 
information of the relevant user account(s). 
Section 2703(f) does not mandate a specific format for a preservation 
request. Rather, the government may submit a request to a service provider 
via a phone call, fax, or e-mail.84 A preservation request does not require 
any degree of suspicion, need, exigency, or judicial approval.85 Upon the 
receipt of a preservation request, the service provider must take all 
necessary steps to copy and retain all existing records and other evidence 
pursuant to the request. 
As mentioned above in the United States v. Warshak discussion, a 
preservation request does not authorize the monitoring and freezing of 
prospective records and other evidence not yet created.86 The court in 
Warshak permitted the freezing of prospective records only because of the 
government’s good faith reliance.87 Section 2703(f) only permits the 
government to request that a service provider preserve the records and 
other evidence it already has in its possession. The government does not 
obtain access to the information using a preservation request. The “f” letter 
only preserves any existing evidence while the government obtains a court 
order or other process. 
Such preservation requests are often accompanied by a Non-
Disclosure Order (NDO), which permits the investigators to direct service 
providers not to disclose the existence of the preservation request to the 
user or any other person (other than necessary to comply with the request). 
Alternatively, the “f” letter may contain a non-disclosure request in which 
investigators simply ask the provider not to disclose the existence of the 
preservation letter.88 
Although the Warshak decision received much attention in the legal 
community—especially among electronic surveillance scholars and 
 
 83. Orin Kerr, Opinion, The Fourth Amendment and Email Preservation Letters, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/ 
10/28/the-fourth-amendment-and-email-preservation-letters/ [https://perma.cc/MJV3-84YN]. 
 84. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 140. 
 85. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 83; Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al. in Support 
of Defendant-Appellant Kaleb Basey at 6, United States v. Basey, 784 F. App’x 497 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(No. 18-30121), 2019 WL 829338, at *6 [hereinafter ACLU Brief]. 
 86. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (2010); KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, 
supra note 25, at 700; DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 140. 
 87. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. 
 88. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705. 
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practitioners—the public remains generally unaware of the regularity with 
which the government issues preservation letters and the frequency with 
which service providers comply with such requests. This is in spite of the 
fact that the many service providers contain law enforcement exceptions 
in their Privacy Policies or Terms of Service (TOS) and publish 
“Transparency Reports” detailing the number and types of requests they 
receive. Part II of this article surveys various service providers’ Privacy 
Policies and Transparency reports. 
II. PRIVACY POLICIES, TERMS OF SERVICE, AND TRANSPARENCY 
REPORTS 
Service providers that offer services to the general public and possess 
users’ data often receive search warrants, subpoenas, preservation 
requests, or other legal processes from the government. A service provider 
may be required to disclose any and all information it possesses that is 
associated with a specific user account or numerous accounts. This may 
include content or non-content information. Such requests, especially if 
for content information, will generally require a warrant. 
Law enforcement entities are also authorized to demand that a 
service provider preserve all records and other evidence related to an 
account. In this scenario, the government will submit a § 2703(f) letter to 
the service provider in question and request that all records and other 
information related to the account be preserved. 
In an effort to balance user privacy and investigatory needs, service 
providers will often indicate in their Privacy Policy or TOS89 that they will 
comply with legitimate legal process. Google, for instance, states: “We 
will share personal information outside of Google if we have a good-faith 
belief that access, use, preservation, or disclosure of the information is 
reasonably necessary to: [m]eet any applicable law, regulation, legal 
process, or enforceable governmental request.”90 Amazon claims it “does 
not disclose customer information in response to government demands 
unless [Amazon is] required to do so to comply with a legally valid and 
binding order.”91 Facebook’s Data Policy explains that the company will 
access, preserve and share [user] information with regulators, law 
enforcement or others: In response to a legal request (like a search 
 
 89. This article uses the phrase “Terms of Service” to refer to Terms of Service as well as Terms 
of Use. 
 90. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Mar. 31, 2020), https://policies.google.com/privacy#infosharing 
[https://perma.cc/KL68-C64F]. 
 91. Law Enforcement Information Requests, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/ 
customer/display.html?nodeId=GYSDRGWQ2C2CRYEF [https://perma.cc/9KDK-2KZK]. 
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warrant, court order or subpoena) if [it has] a good faith belief that 
the law requires [it] to do so . . . . Information [Facebook] receive[s] 
about [a user] (including financial transaction data related to 
purchases made with Facebook) can be accessed and preserved for 
an extended period when it is the subject of a legal request or 
obligation, governmental investigation, or investigations of possible 
violations of our terms or policies, or otherwise to prevent harm.92 
Similarly, Twitter’s Privacy Policy states that it “may preserve, use, 
share, or disclose [users’] personal data or other safety data if [Twitter] 
believe[s] that it is reasonably necessary to comply with a law, regulation, 
legal process, or governmental request[.]”93 In its guidelines for law 
enforcement, Twitter explains that the company accepts requests from law 
enforcement to preserve records, that it will preserve a temporary snapshot 
of the relevant account records for ninety days, and that it will not disclose 
preserved evidence without valid legal process.94 In order for a 
preservation request to be valid, Twitter requires the requesting agency to 
sign the request, have a valid return official e-mail address, be on official 
law enforcement letterhead, and include the @username and URL of the 
subject Twitter profile.95 Such requests can be uploaded via a website 
provided by Twitter.96 
Though a service provider may preserve all information related to a 
specified account or set of accounts pursuant to a § 2703(f) request without 
informing the account user, service providers regularly tell law 
enforcement that they will notify the relevant account user(s) prior to 
disclosing content information. For instance, Amazon explains that 
“unless prohibited from doing so or [if] there is clear indication of illegal 
conduct in connection with the use of Amazon products or services, 
Amazon notifies customers before disclosing content information.”97 Two 
facts are important to highlight: (1) such statements typically limit user 
notification to situations in which content information is being disclosed 
and not where non-content information is at issue; and (2) law enforcement 
 
 92. Data Policy, FACEBOOK (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/policy.php#legal-
requests-prevent-harm [https://perma.cc/8W3Q-WTD5]. 
 93. Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER (June 18, 2020), https://twitter.com/en/privacy 
[https://perma.cc/5DQT-KDYD]. 
 94. Guidelines for Law Enforcement, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/ 
twitter-law-enforcement-support#6 [https://perma.cc/3WXM-XK2K]. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Legal Request Submissions, TWITTER, https://legalrequests.twitter.com/forms/ 
landing_disclaimer [https://perma.cc/8UD2-2KK4] [hereinafter TWITTER, 2016]. Facebook provides 
a similar online portal through which law enforcement can “expeditiously submit formal preservation 
requests.” Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
safety/groups/law/guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/AM2D-YPPP]. 
 97. See Law Enforcement Information Requests, supra note 91. 
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has the option of including an NDO with its preservation request, which 
prohibits the service provider from disclosing the existence of such a 
request. An NDO, however, must be approved and signed by a court, 
which generally requires law enforcement to illustrate to the court a certain 
amount of existing evidence as to why the account must be preserved. This 
ensures a degree of oversight by a neutral and detached magistrate thereby 
protecting user privacy. 
As noted above, service providers often include law enforcement 
compliance information in their Privacy Policy or TOS. Nonetheless, users 
rarely read or understand these policies. A Brookings Institution survey 
found that three quarters of online users rarely read the TOS.98 Further, 
according to the New York Times, the vast majority of privacy policies 
exceed the college reading level, and over half of Americans may struggle 
to understand these dense and lengthy texts.99 It remains questionable 
whether users have a firm appreciation of how effortlessly investigators 
can request the preservation of user account information and how 
frequently service providers comply with such requests. As user awareness 
of privacy issues has increased, companies have attempted to provide more 
transparency regarding their privacy practices. One outcome is the 
publication of Transparency Reports. Service providers may choose to 
publish Transparency Reports disclosing the statistics about the quantity 
and types of requests they have received. The next section focuses on 
preservation request statistics published in Transparency Reports. 
First, Google began reporting on the number of requests for user or 
account information in the first half of 2011.100 As indicated by the data, 
Google’s first indication of receiving preservation requests from law 
enforcement is during the period between July 2014 through December 
2014.101 During that time period, Google received 4,290 preservation 
requests from investigators in the United States.102 That number has 
 
 98. Darrell M. West, Brookings Survey Finds Three-Quarters of Online Users Rarely Read 
Business Terms of Service, BROOKINGS (May 21, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/ 
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 99. Kevin Litman-Navarro, Opinion, We Read 150 Privacy Policies. They Were an 
Incomprehensible Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019 
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 101. This is according to the data available in Google’s Transparency Report. See id. It is 
possible that Google did not maintain any data regarding the receipt of preservation requests prior to 
this date. 
 102. Id. 
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steadily increased during each reporting term with the exception of one 
term. The number of preservation requests between January and June 2016 
was 5,817; this figure dropped to 5,717 for the period between June and 
December 2016.103 In its most recent reporting term (July 2018–December 
2018), Google received 9,578 preservation requests.104 It is important to 
note that a single preservation request does not necessarily seek the 
preservation of a single user’s account; rather, a single preservation 
request may seek to preserve information associated with multiple 
accounts.105 As such, the actual number of individual user accounts 
implicated in § 2703(f) requests is likely to be significantly higher than the 
published numbers. 
Second, Facebook provides a more detailed breakdown of the 
information concerning data requests. Facebook categorizes the requests 
it receives as “Preservation Requests” and “Preservation Accounts 
Preserved.” At the time of writing this Article, Facebook’s data regarding 
preservation requests covers the period between the first half (H1) of 2016 
through the second half (H2) of 2018.106 According to this data, from 
January 2016 through June 2016, the company received 31,894 
preservation requests from law enforcement entities in the United 
States.107 During this same period, the number for Preservation Accounts 
Preserved was 56,714.108 Similar to Google, the number of preservation 
requests to Facebook steadily increased during each reporting period since 
2016, with the exception of H2 2017, during which the number of requests 
decreased from 48,836 (H1 2017) to 47,127 (H2 2017).109 In its latest 
figures (H2 2018), Facebook reveals that it received 56,404 Preservation 
Requests and preserved information from 95,799 user accounts.110 
Finally, Twitter has a similar story. It began providing preservation 
request records in 2016, and the company explains that it received 1,283 
preservation requests in H1 2016, affecting 3,311 accounts.111 By H2 
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 105. Id. (“A single user data request may seek information about multiple accounts, so the 
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2018, Twitter had received 3,265 preservation requests from investigators 
in the U.S. with 1,187 accounts specified.112 This means that law 
enforcement agencies were only able to identify about one-third of the 
specified accounts for which they sought information.113 These figures 
indicate that investigators often lack specific information about which  
user accounts may contain evidence related to an investigation.  
Further, since investigators need not meet the high threshold of a warrant 
when issuing a preservation request, they appear to cast a wider net when 
issuing such requests. 
Part II provided some statistics as to the quantity of preservation 
requests issued by investigators in the United States. The companies 
examined are not the only entities which receive and comply with law 
enforcement requests. Nor are they the only service providers that disclose 
the statistics related to such requests. These companies were selected and 
discussed primarily due to their market size and influence. Part III 
discusses the policy and legal considerations surrounding § 2703(f). 
III. POLICY AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This Article has discussed the historical context and background of 
the SCA, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), and the figures surrounding 
the issuance of preservation requests. Part III aims to impartially present 
and evaluate both the benefits and harms of using “f” letters as a law 
enforcement tool. 
A. Benefits of Section 2703(f) 
Proponents of § 2703(f) make several arguments as to why 
preservation requests, as the mechanism and provision currently exist, are 
valuable and constitutionally valid. First, the existing regime guarantees 
that potential evidence of a crime will not be destroyed or lost before 
investigators can obtain valid legal process to compel the disclosure of the 
preserved information. Second, it permits the government to preserve 
evidence in a minimally intrusive way. Third, preservation of records and 
other evidence does not constitute a search or seizure, and even if it does, 
the user has consented to the preservation. Finally, the preservation  
of account information pursuant to § 2703(f) is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
 112. Transparency Report: Information Requests, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/ 
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1. Preservation Requests Help Protect Evidence 
When § 2703(f) was drafted in 1996, the nature of the Internet, 
electronic surveillance, and data processing and storage were vastly 
different than today. It was common for a service provider to delete 
account records every thirty to sixty days in the 1990s.114 As such, it was 
sometimes necessary for investigators to request the preservation of 
evidence while they obtained valid legal process.115 
This was a real concern for law enforcement as acknowledged by the 
DOJ: If “a crime occurs on Day 1, agents learn of the crime on Day 28, 
begin work on a search warrant on Day 29, and obtain the warrant on Day 
32, only to learn that the network service provider deleted the records in 
the ordinary course of business on Day 30,” then the relevant evidence has 
been lost and valuable governmental resources have been wasted.116 
Section 2703(f) minimizes this risk by requiring a service provider  
to freeze the records while the government presents evidence to a neutral 
magistrate in the hope of obtaining a subpoena, warrant, or (d) order. 
Should the government fail to do so, the service provider is free to  
delete the records after ninety days, or one hundred eighty days if the 
government obtained a preservation extension, thereby ensuring that the 
government does not gain access to the preserved information without 
valid legal process. 
Having the authority to issue a preservation request while continuing 
the investigation also provides investigators the opportunity to 
comprehensively examine the evidence and reduces the burden on the 
judiciary. A lot of time and resources could be wasted if investigators were 
required to obtain judicial approval for a preservation request without first 
being certain that the relevant records even exist. As the process currently 
functions, investigators can request the preservation of records, investigate 
further, and if relevant evidence exists, advocate for a neutral magistrate 
to issue the legal process authorizing the government to access the records. 
Alternatively, law enforcement may discover that the records sought do 
not exist or do exist but do not contain relevant evidence. If the records do 
not exist, then the issuance of a preservation letter does not cause any 
harm; the service provider simply notifies the government that it does not 
have any relevant information in its possession to preserve. If the records 
do exist but are irrelevant, because investigators have not obtained access 
to the data, they can refocus their inquiry elsewhere. In this case, the 
service provider will delete the records in the ordinary course of business. 
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2. Preservation Requests are a Minimally Intrusive Process 
In addition to protecting potentially valuable evidence, preservation 
letters are also a minimally intrusive investigative method. A § 2703(f) 
request does not preserve any content or non-content information 
prospectively. It does not permit the disclosure of information to the 
government without valid legal process. And, it offers a way to further 
investigatory needs without interfering with a user’s use of her account. 
As the court stated in Warshak, “the plain language of § 2703(f) 
permits only the preservation of e-mails in the service provider’s 
possession at the time of the request, not the preservation of future  
e-mails.”117 This holding has been incorporated into the DOJ’s current 
approach on searching and seizing computers and obtaining electronic 
evidence. The DOJ Manual directs agents not to use “f” letters 
prospectively to order service providers to preserve records not yet 
created.118 This limitation is noteworthy. By restricting the preservation of 
account information to the data the service provider has in its possession 
at the time of the request, the provision ensures that the government does 
not circumvent the higher standards prescribed for conducting real time 
surveillance denounced in United States v. Warshak and that any privacy 
intrusion by the government is minimal. 
Moreover, a § 2703(f) letter does not, by itself, mandate the 
disclosure of information; it only requires the preservation of existing 
account information. A service provider is not obligated to disclose 
preserved information—and is free to delete the information in the 
ordinary course of business once the preservation request period ends—if 
the government fails to obtain valid legal process. Consequently, a 
preservation of information, by itself and without further disclosure, has 
no bearing on the privacy of a user. 
Preservation letters are also minimally intrusive because they do not 
interfere with a user’s use of her account. When a service provider receives 
a § 2703(f) request, it typically does not notify the account user, does not 
restrict access to the account, and does not terminate the account. In fact, 
the DOJ’s Sample Language for Preservation Requests states: 
I request that you not disclose the existence of this request to the 
subscriber or any other person, other than as necessary to comply 
with this request. If compliance with this request might result in a 
permanent or temporary termination of service to the Account, or 
 
 117. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 335 (6th Cir. 2010) (Keith, J., concurring). 
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otherwise alert any user of the Account as to your actions to preserve 
the information described below, please contact me as soon as 
possible and before taking action.119 
Hence, the service provider will ordinarily make a copy of the 
account information and maintain it for the duration of the request period. 
This approach to preserving evidence is beneficial and constitutionally 
valid for three reasons. First, it does not interfere with a user’s possessory 
interest in her account since the user is not made aware that her data was 
electronically preserved. If a user has no idea that her information has been 
copied, and if the information is deleted without the government ever 
gaining access to it, then the government has not interfered with the user’s 
use of her account. Second, the service provider is permitted to delete any 
copied account information if the government does not obtain valid legal 
process. And third, the user is free to use or delete her account  
as she deems suitable, even if a copy of the account is preserved by the 
service provider.120 
Section 2703(f) prohibits the government from preserving account 
information prospectively or gaining access to the user’s data without 
valid legal process. Even when account information is preserved, the user 
may continue using her account. In fact, as evinced by the DOJ’s sample 
language, the government endeavors to ensure the user is not made aware 
of the preservation request and asks that the service provider not alert the 
user when preserving the data in the account. Proponents of “f” requests 
agree that these safeguards guarantee the preservation of account 
information pursuant to a § 2703(f) request is minimally intrusive. 
3. No Government Action, No (Fourth Amendment) Problem 
As federal law currently stands, the preservation of account 
information is constitutionally valid because it is carried out by a private 
entity and not the government. In order for the Fourth Amendment to 
apply, the conduct at issue must be by a government agent. While private 
parties can be considered a government agent for the purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, the government contends that a service provider 
preserving account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) request is not 
acting as an agent of the government because it is merely complying with 
a legal duty.121 Accordingly, the preservation of account information  
does not create an agency relationship and does not violate the  
Fourth Amendment. 
 
 119. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 225. 
 120. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 83. 
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4. Preservation Requests Are Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment 
Even if there is an agency relationship, the government has argued in 
a recent case that the preservation of account information is not a 
seizure.122 The government further maintains that if a preservation request 
constitutes a search or seizure, it is one that is reasonable and consequently 
constitutionally permissible. Notwithstanding these arguments, the 
government also believes that two exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
apply to preservation requests. 
A seizure involves “some meaningful interference with an 
individual’s possessory interest in [her] property.”123 Because a user 
maintains unhindered access to her account despite the service provider’s 
copying of the account information, the government is not meaningfully 
interfering with the user’s possessory interest. So, according to the 
government, preservation of account information is not a seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
To determine whether searches and seizures are reasonable, courts 
rely on the two-pronged Katz test mentioned in Part I. The government’s 
position regarding the use of “f” letters is that users do not have a 
subjective expectation of privacy because the TOS inform users that 
service providers will comply with valid legal process, which may entail 
the preservation of user account information. The existence of the third-
party doctrine also supports the proposition that users do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their preserved account information. 
According to this doctrine, individuals do not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily turn over to a third 
party. Since users willingly provide their information to service providers, 
they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information. 
Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and 
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seizures, and because users do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in such information, their Fourth Amendment rights are not 
violated by the government’s use of “f” letters. 
The government claims that consent is the first exception to the 
warrant requirement for seizures.124 It argues that consent exception 
applies to preservation requests because if users want to use a service, they 
generally have to agree to the TOS.125 Customarily, the TOS will contain 
a provision that declares the company will share user information to 
comply with all applicable laws and regulations. The government contends 
that users, through their acceptance of the TOS, have consented to their 
service provider preserving their account information.126 Because users 
have consented, consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, and service providers have  
common authority over the servers on which the account information 
resides, the preservation of the account information does not violate  
the Fourth Amendment. 
The second exception to the warrant requirement is one involving 
exigent circumstances. Under this exception a warrantless seizure may be 
constitutional if the government has probable cause to believe that the item 
or place in question contains evidence of a crime, and it seeks to prevent 
the imminent destruction of that evidence.127 Data is especially easy to 
pulverize. It follows that § 2703(f) serves a compelling government 
interest in that it permits electronic evidence, which can be “deleted 
irretrievably in an instant,” to be preserved long enough for investigators 
to obtain appropriate legal process under exigent circumstances.128 
As the process currently exists, there is a strong and valid argument 
that it provides a fair balance between a compelling government interest 
in obtaining evidence and protecting the privacy of individuals. Records 
are preserved only temporarily, are not accessed by the government 
without the appropriate legal process, and the service provider can delete 
copied records after the preservation period concludes. Preservation 
requests do not apply prospectively, do not hinder a user’s access to her 
records, and are generally minimally intrusive. Importantly, the 
preservation of records by a service provider is not a seizure. Even if the 
preservation of account information constituted a seizure, it is reasonable. 
Because users have consented to the TOS and are on notice that a service 
provider will comply with applicable laws and regulations, users do not 
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have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their account information, 
which is in the possession of the service provider. The preservation of 
account information pursuant to § 2703(f) also falls within the consent 
exception to the warrant requirement if a user has consented to the service 
provider’s TOS. Finally, the ease with which a user can erase electronic 
information—which may be valuable evidence of a crime—justifies the 
warrantless preservation of electronic evidence by the government through 
a preservation request under the exigent circumstances exception. 
B. Harms of Section 2703(f) 
Critics of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) maintain that the provision is outdated, 
circumvents privacy protections by avoiding judicial oversight, is relied 
upon excessively, contains textual inconsistencies,129 lacks Fourth 
Amendment safeguards, and violates the Fourth Amendment because it 
infringes on users’ reasonable expectation of privacy and constitutes a 
seizure. The following subsections examine each of these assertions. 
1. New Technology, New Concerns 
Section 2703(f) was drafted in the 1990s. At that time, copious long-
term storage by service providers was not possible. In fact, an important 
milestone in data storage occurred in 1996 when “digital storage became 
more cost-effective for storing data than paper.”130 In the 1990s, advanced 
corporate hard-drives stored approximately two gigabytes of data.131 
Today, consumer-friendly computers are typically equipped with 250 
gigabyte hard drives, while corporate hard drives can store terabytes of 
data.132 This growing storage capacity has correlated with users creating 
significantly more quantities of data. In 2012, IBM estimated that “90% 
of the data in the world today has been created in the last two years.”133 In 
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2017, individuals produced 2.5 quintillion bytes of data.134 This figure is 
likely drastically higher today given the growth of Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices,135 and it will only continue to increase in large part due to the 
rapid expansion of the technology industry combined with the ubiquity of 
wireless networks and the industry’s decision to create more 
interconnected smart devices. 
This evolution of data creation and storage capability allows service 
providers to store substantially more data for considerably longer 
durations. This concern was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Riley v. 
California.136 In that case, a unanimous Court acknowledged that most 
adults now carry phones, which are capable of storing more sensitive 
information for a longer duration. Therefore, allowing the police to search 
a phone without a warrant is different from allowing them to occasionally 
search an item or two.137 
Accordingly, while relying on “f” letters may have been prudent in 
the 1990s, their use may no longer be necessary.138 This is because thirty 
years ago a service provider routinely deleted records every thirty to sixty 
days.139 In today’s environment, however, a service provider can and does 
store data for longer periods. Because companies now have the ability to 
maintain user data for longer, the government has ample opportunity to 
seek valid legal process and obtain the records using a warrant, (d) order, 
or subpoena without the need to preserve the evidence using “f” letters. If 
there are exigent circumstances and investigators are concerned that 
certain records may be deleted or destroyed, the government may still rely 
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on the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment in lieu 
of looking to § 2703(f) to preserve account information. However, as the 
law currently stands, law enforcement officers use preservation requests 
because the process is simply easier. 
Not only is § 2703(f) outdated but the privacy concerns it implicates 
have become more common with technological advances. One such 
example is the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data to 
the information obtained through a preservation request. Big Data is a field 
that allows for the analysis of extremely large data sets to reveal patterns, 
trends, and associations. When the government requests the “preservation 
of all stored communications, records, and other evidence” in the 
possession of a service provider, it is potentially gaining access to an 
extremely large data set.140 The government can consolidate these large 
sets of data and use AI and other modern technology to create a detailed 
log not just of a person’s movement—which was the concern of the 
Supreme Court in Carpenter141—but also a detailed account of  
all of a person’s activities, likes, dislikes, and opinions. This type of 
surveillance may have been a worry of dystopian science fiction novels in 
the past, but modern technology has made it a legitimate, palpable, and 
fully realized concern. 
2. The Preservation Request Process Lacks Judicial Oversight 
The lack of judicial oversight is another concern. The Fourth 
Amendment protects the privacy of individuals through various 
safeguards. These include requiring the government to have probable 
cause that a crime has been committed or that evidence of the crime is 
present in the place to be searched or item to be seized; particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; 
requiring that there be a risk that evidence will be destroyed; mandating 
law enforcement to seek legal process within a reasonable time; or 
requiring oversight by a neutral and detached judge. None of these 
protections exist under § 2703(f). 
a. Probable Cause 
One of the ways that the Fourth Amendment protects people and 
places against unreasonable searches and seizures is by requiring that the 
government obtain a warrant based on probable cause when searching or 
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seizing people, places, or things.142 The concept of probable cause has 
been interpreted as context-dependent, and the Supreme Court has defined 
it as “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place.”143 Probable cause depends on the totality of 
circumstances, and it is a threshold that the government must meet when 
submitting an affidavit to a judge for a warrant. 
Yet, § 2703(f) lacks this safeguard. The provision “gives law 
enforcement the power to unilaterally, and without suspicion or judicial 
approval, compel . . . service providers,” through a phone call, fax, e-mail, 
or letter, to preserve their users’ account information.144 The text of the 
statute provides no specific guidance for making a request. When issuing 
a § 2703(f) letter, the government is not required to provide a judge with 
an affidavit supporting a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be 
found in the account records sought to be preserved. As such, a 
preservation request does not satisfy the Supreme Court-established 
requirement of proving probable cause prior to conducting a seizure. 
The ambiguity of § 2703(f)’s language is also problematic. Whereas 
most provisions in § 2703 refer to “content” or “records,” subsection (f) 
refers to “records and other evidence.”145 As noted above,146 there is a 
difference between content and non-content information or records. The 
former is the substance of a communication, whereas the latter 
encompasses transaction records, routing information, or logs. 
Practitioners and scholars have analogized this distinction to a physical 
envelope containing a letter; the content is the substance of the letter inside 
the envelope, while the non-content information is the address on the 
outside of the envelope. The service provider in this example would be the 
post office or entity delivering the envelope. Clearly, the post office must 
read the outside of the envelope in order to deliver it. Yet, it would be 
inappropriate and illegal—absent the existence of exceptions or a 
warrant—for the post office or law enforcement to intercept, open, and 
read the content or substance of the letter. 
But because § 2703(f) relies on vague language—i.e., records and 
other evidence—it is unclear whether content falls within the purview of 
the subsection. In practice, when a service provider receives a preservation 
request it copies both the content and non-content information associated 
with the account or accounts. Preserving non-content information without 
a warrant is similar to a litigation hold. A company involved in a legal 
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action may receive notice in anticipation of a lawsuit or investigation, 
ordering it to preserve documents and other materials relating to that 
lawsuit or investigation.147 This litigation hold temporarily prevents the 
destruction of the company’s records and other relevant evidence in the 
ordinary course of business and ensures the availability of such evidence 
for the discovery process. 
A service provider relies on non-content information when 
conducting its business. For example, when a user posts a message on a 
social media platform, the platform or service provider needs the routing 
information in order to successfully transmit and publish that 
communication. Though this non-content information relates to the 
content created by the user, the user does not have ownership of the routing 
or transactional information. As such, requiring a company to retain the 
non-content information pursuant to a preservation request is deemed to 
be within the bounds of § 2703(f). 
In contrast, if investigators, lacking a warrant, request that a social 
media company preserve the files uploaded by its users, they would 
effectively circumvent the higher threshold for obtaining content 
information. This distinction is important because while a service provider 
may have control over the content since its platform is being used, the 
content is in fact something that the user has a greater interest in and 
actually owns (as opposed to the non-content information). Preserving 
content information pursuant to a § 2703(f) letter is analogous to law 
enforcement asking a landlord to access a tenant’s dwelling (or several 
tenants’ dwellings), document everything inside, and preserve all the 
documented information only for investigators to possibly return ninety or 
180 days later to legitimize the initial warrantless entry. Though the 
preservation of non-content information can be detrimental to Fourth 
Amendment protections, the warrantless preservation of content 
information is particularly harmful. 
In showing that probable cause exists, investigators must particularly 
describe “the place to be searched[] and the persons or things to be 
seized.”148 According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he manifest purpose of 
this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches”149 and to 
prohibit “the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.”150 
This was the Founders’ response to the “general warrants” and “writs of 
assistance,” which permitted the British King’s agents to carry out wide-
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ranging searches and seizures during the colonial era. The continued usage 
of such writs, despite the Founders’ denunciation of these “worst 
instrument[s] of arbitrary power,” ultimately contributed to the revulsion 
against the Crown.151 This constitutional requirement has also been 
codified; Rule 41(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that the 
warrant identify the person or property to be searched and identify any 
person or property to be seized. 
Some circuits have established a multi-factor test to determine 
whether the specificity or particularity requirement is met. The Ninth 
Circuit, for instance, considers 
one or more of the following factors: “(1) whether probable cause 
exists to seize all items of a particular type described in the warrant; 
(2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which 
executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from 
those which are not; and (3) whether the government was able to 
describe the items more particularly in light of the information 
available to it at the time the warrant was issued.”152 
In a traditional investigation of physical space or one involving 
tangible evidence, determining whether the particularity requirement is 
satisfied can be straightforward. For instance, if investigators believe that 
evidence of a crime exists inside a home, they may seek a warrant to search 
the entire house; however, a magistrate will generally not authorize the 
government to seize all the contents of the house because such a warrant 
would be overbroad. 
Analyzing searches and seizures involving digital evidence on a 
physical computer are more complex. “Most computer warrants are 
executed in two stages. First, the computer hardware is taken away; 
second, the computer is searched for electronic evidence. The physical 
search comes first, and the electronic search comes second.”153 Essentially, 
investigators search the house or relevant location for the computer, seize 
the computer, and perform the digital search at a later time. Imagine a 
scenario in which law enforcement is authorized to seize a specific hard 
drive and search for evidence of a crime. The physical seizure is 
uncomplicated. However, the digital search and seizure are complicated. 
Is the government authorized to search every folder and directory on the 
hard drive, or must it limit its search to those files and folders that relate 
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to the investigation? Courts generally issue warrants that include a list of 
specific items to be searched, accompanied by a “‘catch-all’ provision 
allowing the seizure of any computer and electronic storage devices.”154 
Such warrants have generally been held to be sufficiently particular, 
thereby simplifying the physical and electronic search process.155 
Applying the particularity requirement to the seizure of purely 
intangible evidence is more challenging.156 The Federal Rules of Evidence 
provide some flexibility for searching and seizing electronic evidence. 
Specifically, Rule 41(e)(2)(B) sanctions a two-step process that authorizes 
investigators, when possessing a warrant, to seize a storage media 
containing electronic evidence for later review. The government, however, 
must have a warrant to seize the evidence in the first place, a safeguard 
that is lacking under § 2703(f). 
As noted previously, there is no legally prescribed format for a 
preservation request.157 When seeking to preserve account information, the 
government typically issues a letter to the service provider identifying an 
account or range of accounts by username, e-mail address, or telephone 
number. While investigators are sometimes aware of the specific  
identity of an individual whose account information they seek, 
occasionally the government is only able to identify an account based on 
an IP address. Therefore, the government is unaware of the identity of the 
specific individual. 
As mentioned in Part II, preservation requests do not necessarily 
demand the preservation of a single user’s account; rather, a single 
preservation request may require the service provider to preserve 
information associated with multiple accounts.158 In the second half of 
2018, for instance, Facebook received a total of 71,400 Preservation 
Requests and preserved information from 119,600 accounts.159 Of these, 
56,404 preservation requests were from U.S. law enforcement alone, 
resulting in the preservation of information from 95,799 accounts. Data 
provided by Twitter also reveals that the company has received 3,265 
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preservation requests from investigators in the U.S. in the second half of 
2018; investigators, however, only identified 1,187 specific accounts.160 
This means that the government was only able to specifically identify 
about one-third of the accounts for which it sought information. The DOJ’s 
Sample Language for Preservation Requests under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) 
asks service providers to preserve “[a]ll records and other information 
relating to the Account and any associated accounts.”161 This discrepancy 
in the number of preservation requests issued and specific accounts 
identified, as well as the DOJ’s broad language seeking the preservation 
of information relating to the account and any associated accounts, reveals 
that investigators are not sufficiently meeting the particularity 
requirement. Rather, they are casting a wide net and hoping to capture and 
preserve evidence potentially related to an investigation. In practice, this 
leads to the seizure of a significant amount of irrelevant and private data, 
thus running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
3. Preservation Requests Are Used Excessively 
Constitutional safeguards exist to curb government power, prevent 
abuse, and ensure that if the government seeks to surveil an entity, it has 
cause to do so. By requiring a subpoena, (d) order, or warrant that 
mandates oversight by a neutral and detached magistrate and a finding of 
probable cause, the Constitution and statutory laws make it more 
challenging for law enforcement to surveil individuals or to seize and 
search people or their property. 
Preservation letters lack any such safeguards. They are often issued 
without law enforcement having any suspicion, need, or exigency.162 In 
fact, the DOJ recommends that investigators seek the preservation of 
evidence as soon as possible when they have reason to believe that 
electronic evidence exists.163 The government argues that it is simply 
preserving evidence but not accessing it until it returns with valid legal 
process. In reality, investigators often do not return with valid legal 
process and the service provider destroys the preserved information at the 
conclusion of the ninety (or one hundred eighty) days—or in the ordinary 
course of business. Alternatively, “[w]hen investigators do return with a 
court order authorizing a search of the targeted account, they commonly 
wait months to do so.”164 Extending a preservation request, and even more 
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so, returning with legal process, occur so infrequently that in one case a 
court noted that 
this is the first time the Court can remember the government 
indicating it renewed its preservation request for the one-time, 
additional time of 90 days, as allowed under § 2703(f)(2). It is also 
the first time the Court can remember the government seeking a 
search warrant within that one-time renewal period, as seems to be 
the intent of subsection (f).165 
As the practice currently exists law enforcement is simply using 
§ 2703(f) to compel service providers to preserve a significant number of 
online accounts “just in case a need for the information arises later in the 
course of an investigation.”166 Facts and figures released by service 
providers in Transparency Reports support this inference. 
Facebook received 56,404 preservation requests from U.S. law 
enforcement entities in the second half of 2018.167 In the same period, it 
preserved 95,799 accounts.168 But the numbers for search warrants, 
subpoenas, court orders, and (d) orders are significantly lower for the 
second half of 2018. Facebook received only 23,801 search warrants 
related to 36,652 accounts; 8,360 subpoenas for 13,728 accounts; 408 
court orders for 510 accounts, and 786 (d) orders for 2,481 accounts.169 
This shows that § 2703(f) is often used as a powerful tool by law 
enforcement to arbitrarily preserve significant, and potentially irrelevant, 
amounts of data without cause or necessity. Such conduct largely  
sidesteps the procedural barriers put in place to prevent government 
overreach and abuse.170 
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4. Preservation Requests Violate Users’ Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when she has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and that 
expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.171 The 
third-party doctrine under Miller and Smith severely diminished privacy 
protections by establishing that individuals have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information they voluntarily provide to a third party. Yet, a 
recent case, Carpenter v. United States,172 appears to have limited the 
third-party doctrine’s application in certain circumstances.173 
In Carpenter, the government obtained Carpenter’s CSLI using court 
orders. Using these records—which covered a 127-day period—the 
government charged the defendant. Carpenter moved to suppress the 
evidence, arguing that the seizure of the CSLI violated his Fourth 
Amendment because the records had been obtained without a warrant 
supported by probable cause.174 The Supreme Court held that the 
government’s warrantless acquisition of the CSLI violated the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.175 
The majority reasoned that the seizure of an individual’s CSLI was an 
“entirely different species of business records—something that implicates 
basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary government power 
much more directly than corporate tax or payroll ledgers.”176 Of particular 
concern to the Court was the government’s ability to use third party 
records—CSLI in this case—to create a “detailed log of a person’s 
movement over several years.”177 While a user’s account information may 
not provide as detailed a log as would her CSLI, the data from an 
individual’s account can be used to establish a person’s movements and 
conduct over a period of time. 
For instance, if the government requests that a service  
provider—a social media platform, an electric scooter company, or a 
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ridesharing company—preserve a user’s account information, that data 
can be used to establish a comprehensive record of the individual’s 
movements. An individual’s movement can reveal a lot of details 
regarding her interests and private life. This would arguably be in conflict 
with the holding of Carpenter since the records are preserved pursuant to 
a government request without a warrant. 
One court has considered the applicability of Carpenter to 
preservation requests. In United States v. Rosenow, the defendant, relying 
on Carpenter, asserted that the government unlawfully seized his private 
communications by issuing preservation requests to third parties without 
a warrant based on probable cause.178 The government countered that the 
preservation of Rosenow’s account was “not a meaningful interference 
with the Defendant’s possessory interest in his account” because he “was 
free to continue to use his account.”179 The court agreed with the 
government and held that, because the “preservation requests in this case 
did not interfere with the Defendant’s use of his accounts and did not 
entitle the Government to obtain any information without further legal 
process[,] . . . the preservation requests . . . did not amount to an intrusion 
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements.”180 Before addressing the 
possessory interest argument,181 this Article will address whether users 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their account information, 
which would require the government to obtain a warrant, (d) order, or 
subpoena prior to submitting a preservation request. 
As discussed in Part II, users rarely read or understand TOS or 
Privacy Policies.182 When individuals do read these documents the 
majority of them may struggle to understand these legally sophisticated 
texts.183 An individual who does not understand the TOS or Privacy Policy 
of her service provider can reasonably argue that she had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in her account. Nonetheless, courts are unlikely to 
find that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy because society may 
not recognize this expectation as objectively reasonable because virtually 
all service providers require their users to agree—in some form—to their 
TOS, thereby making individuals aware of the existence and function of 
these documents. Critics of § 2703(f) may assert that average users do not 
understand these documents as they are full of legalese. Because an 
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average individual cannot understand the TOS or Privacy Policy, she 
cannot provide informed consent to the terms and therefore has a 
subjective expectation of privacy. Moreover, because the majority of 
society is unable to fully appreciate the TOS or Privacy Policy, as well as 
the implications of such documents, then an individual’s subjective 
expectation of privacy may be objectively reasonable. 
Alternatively, critics also argue that users have an expectation of 
privacy in their account information because most take proactive measures 
to prevent others’ access to their account. In United States v. Haydel, the 
government searched Haydel’s parents’ residence pursuant to a warrant.184 
In the course of the search, law enforcement discovered incriminating 
evidence in a cardboard box located under the bed of Haydel’s parents.185 
Haydel claimed that the records were seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, and the court sought to determine whether he “had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy for records secreted in his parents’ home 
and under their bed.”186 Analyzing the facts, the court found that Haydel’s 
parents had given him permission to use their home and had given him a 
key, thereby providing him unencumbered access.187 The court stated that 
Haydel owned the records that were seized and found that he “had the 
authority to exclude persons other than his parents and their guests from 
the home.”188 This, the court believed, made it sufficiently clear that 
Haydel “exhibited a subjective expectation that the contents of the box 
stowed under his parents’ bed were to remain private.”189 As such, the 
court held that Haydel had a legitimate expectation of privacy  
in the area searched.190 
Similarly, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their account information because they utilize access controls, such as a 
username and password, to prevent others’ access to their account. Similar 
to Haydel, where the defendant’s parents permitted him to use their 
residence and provided him a key, service providers allow users to use 
their infrastructure but provide users a “key” to access their own accounts. 
Further, because users have unique login credentials and can exclude 
others from their accounts, they clearly exhibit a subjective expectation 
that the information in their account remain private. Therefore, users have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in their account information. 
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Finally, if information obtained pursuant to a warrantless 
preservation request is combined with Big Data analysis it may violate a 
user’s legitimate expectation of privacy in her data. Modern technology 
allows the government to use large sets of data to establish patterns, trends, 
and associations, which can lead to an extremely detailed account of an 
individual’s daily activities and interests. One cause of concern for the 
majority in Carpenter was the government’s ability to use CSLI to obtain 
information that “is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”191 
If the government demands that a service provider preserve a user’s 
account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) request and subsequently 
creates a detailed log of a person’s movements—something that is within 
the capability of modern law enforcement—the individual’s legitimate 
expectation of privacy may be violated.192 
5. Preservation Requests Constitute Unreasonable Seizures 
The preservation of account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) 
request is a violation of the Fourth Amendment because it constitutes an 
unreasonable seizure. A “seizure” involves “some meaningful interference 
with an individual’s possessory interest in [her] property.”193 This 
interference must be by the government or its agent.194 A meaningful 
interference does not necessarily require the government to search the 
property; rather, preventing a user from using her property as she deems 
suitable—which may include deleting the account information or 
prohibiting others from accessing the information—also constitutes a 
meaningful interference with property. 
a. Account Information Is “Property” Within the Meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment’s protection of “effects” has generally been 
understood to extend to personal property195 and “possessions.”196 While 
effects and possessions have traditionally been viewed as tangible items, 
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various states, courts, and jurists have argued that the Fourth Amendment 
protects both tangible and intangible property.197 
The Texas Property Code has defined the term to include “property 
held in any digital or electronic medium.”198 Other state legislatures have 
also considered intangible digital assets to be property. For example, in 
2007, the Indiana state legislature considered a bill that regarded electronic 
documents as “estate property.”199 According to the ACLU, since 2013, at 
least forty-six states have enacted “laws regulating fiduciary duties with 
respect to digital assets, all of which explicitly recognize a deceased or 
incapacitated user’s legal interest in access to their email 
communications.”200 In addition to state legislatures, state courts have also 
recognized intangible digital assets as property. 
In Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., a Massachusetts state court declared that 
an e-mail “account is a form of property often referred to as a ‘digital 
asset.’”201 In Eysoldt v. ProScan Imaging, the court conceded that the 
general rule at common law had only permitted converting tangible 
chattels. But the court stated that the law, which has changed, allows the 
conversion of intangible property rights and therefore permitted action for 
conversion of a web account as intangible property.202 
Given these developments and the evolution of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as related to digital assets, it is reasonable to  
consider data—which encompasses account information—as property 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
b. Individuals Have a Possessory Interest in Their Account 
Information 
Individuals whose account information is preserved pursuant to a 
§ 2703(f) request have a possessory interest in such digital assets. 
Possessory interest is generally defined as the right to control property, 
including the right to exclude others or to delete or destroy property.203 
 
 197. See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-Mail, 
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 135 (2008). See generally Ferguson, supra note 196; United States. v. 
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2010); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) 
(finding that protections of the Fourth Amendment are surely not limited to tangibles). 
 198. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(12) (West 2017). Similarly, “Missouri amended its state 
constitution in 2014 to protect ‘persons, papers, homes, effects, and electronic communications and 
data, from unreasonable searches and seizures.’” ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 16. 
 199. Alberto B. Lopez, Posthumous Privacy, Decedent Intent, and Post-Mortem Access to 
Digital Assets, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 194 (2016). 
 200. ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 17–18. 
 201. Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 768 (Mass. 2017). 
 202. Eysoldt v. ProScan Imaging, 957 N.E.2d 780, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
 203. Possessory Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); ACLU Brief, supra note 
85, at 15. 
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One need not be the owner of property to have Fourth Amendment 
protections concerning that property.204 Other factors—in addition to 
ownership—that courts consider include: 
whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing 
seized . . . , whether he has the right to exclude others from that place, 
whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would 
remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal 
precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately 
on the premises.205 
The right to exclude others is one of the fundamental elements of 
having possessory interest in real or personal property and has been a  
long-recognized principle of common law and jurisprudence.  
William Blackstone recognized this right in his Commentaries on the Laws 
of England.206 The Supreme Court has recognized this right in  
numerous cases.207 And various circuit courts have also recognized the 
right to exclude others as fundamentally valuable and a quintessential  
property right.208 
 
 204. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980) (“While property ownership is clearly a 
factor to be considered in determining whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated, . . . property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of this Court’s inquiry.”). 
 205. United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 206. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *8 (“The only question remaining is, how this 
property became actually vested; or what it is that gave a man an exclusive right to retain in a 
permanent manner that specific land, which before belonged generally to every body, but particularly 
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 207. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“One of the main rights attaching to 
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characterized as property); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111–12 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (“In my view, that ‘right to exclude’ often may be a principal determinant in the 
establishment of a legitimate Fourth Amendment interest.”); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 
U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the 
legal right to exclude others from enjoying it. If the property is private, the right of exclusion may be 
absolute; if the property is affected with a public interest, the right of exclusion is qualified.”). 
 208. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“In the bundle of rights we 
call property, one of the most valued is the right to sole and exclusive possession—the right 
to exclude strangers, or for that matter friends, but especially the Government.”); United States v. 
King, 227 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ourts have considered a number of factors in identifying 
those expectations which qualify for Fourth Amendment protection . . . includ[ing] whether the 
defendant has the right to exclude others.”); United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 639–40 (2d Cir. 
1993) (“One need not be the owner of the property for his privacy interest to be one that the 
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Having a possessory interest in property also means having the right 
to dispose of or destroy that property. In Buchanan v. Warley, the Court 
held that “[p]roperty is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It 
is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it.”209 
Similarly, in United States v. General Motors Corp., the Supreme Court 
described property rights in a physical thing as “the group of rights 
inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right  
to possess, use and dispose of it.”210 To “dispose of” can mean “to get  
rid of by throwing away or giving or selling to someone else,” or “to 
destroy” the item.211 
Users ordinarily protect their account by using login credentials (i.e., 
usernames and passwords), two-factor authentication, and other methods 
to control access to their information. While a service provider may be 
able to gain access to its users’ account, it would be atypical for a service 
provider to do so without user notice and consent. It follows that users 
have control over their account and property. Given the routine usage of 
access controls, account users clearly expect and rely on the ability to 
exclude others from their accounts. 
Finally, users often have the option to delete their account 
information—whether such information comprises e-mails, photographs, 
or other content—or their account entirely. Certain service providers 
differentiate between “deactivating” and “deleting” an account. For 
instance, Facebook states that if a user “deactivates” her account, she will 
be able to reactivate it whenever she desires and that “some information 
may remain visible to other[ users].”212 In contrast, if a user “deletes” her 
account, the user cannot regain access. The user’s information will not be 
accessible while the account’s deletion is pending and copies of some 
 
Fourth Amendment protects, so long as he has the right to exclude others from dealing with the 
property.”); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154–55 (5th Cir. 1981) (reasoning that courts 
consider “whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized . . . [and] whether he has 
the right to exclude others from that place”); Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 492 n.2 
(4th Cir. 2006) (Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“A Fourth Amendment seizure 
occurs whenever ‘there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in 
that property.’ . . . In this case, the City significantly interfered with perhaps the most important aspect 
of real property ownership—the right to exclude others from one’s property.”) (quoting United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from  
enjoying it . . . .”) (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeish, 
J., dissenting)). 
 209. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917). 
 210. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). 
 211. Dispose (dispose of), THE NEW OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). As relating to 
real property, the term can refer to transferring or selling the property. 
 212. Deactivating or Deleting Your Account, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/1253 
38004213029 [https://perma.cc/C5MH-TLG8]. 
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material—which will be disassociated from personal identifiers—may 
remain in Facebook’s database.213 Considering this distinction between 
“deactivation” and “deletion,” a reasonable user may believe that she has 
destroyed her account entirely, along with the information the account 
contains, by “deleting” her account. If this user’s account information is 
preserved pursuant to a § 2703(f) request before the account is fully 
deleted, her possessory interest in that account has been interfered with. 
Because users exert control over their accounts, and such control 
entails excluding others from access to the account and its information or 
destroying their information or accounts in their entirety, users have a 
possessory interest in their digital accounts. 
c. Preserving Account Information Meaningfully Interferes with the 
Users’ Possessory Interest 
When the government compels a service provider to preserve the 
“records and other evidence in its possession,” the government is 
interfering with the user’s possessory interest in her account  
since the user is no longer capable of excluding others from her account, 
deleting her account or the information within it, or exercising general 
control over her account. 
A meaningful interference can occur when the character or nature of 
the property is fundamentally altered. Property owners are typically 
authorized to exclude others from their property. Therefore, a meaningful 
interference with an owner’s possessory interest occurs when her right to 
exclude others is infringed on. In his dissenting opinion in United States 
v. Karo, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall 
(concurring in part and dissenting in part), declared that the owner of 
property has a right to exclude others—including the government—from 
it, along with a right to use it exclusively for his own purposes.214 
Investigators in Karo installed an electronic tracking device inside a 
container without a warrant.215 While the majority held that the installation 
of the tracking device did not amount to a meaningful interference with 
the defendant’s interest in their possession, Justice Stevens argued that 
“the attachment of the beeper . . . constituted a ‘seizure.’”216 By attaching 
a tracking device to an individual’s property, the government had 
converted the property to its own use and infringed on that exclusionary 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 215. Id. at 708 (majority opinion). 
 216. Id. at 729 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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right.217 In other words, when the government attached an electronic bug 
to the property, it profoundly altered the character of the property, which 
resulted in a meaningful interference with the property owner’s possessory 
interest. Whether the property owner becomes aware or not is irrelevant as 
such knowledge is not required to constitute a meaningful interference. 
Account information is comprised of intangible data—ones and 
zeros. This data can be stored, transferred, or destroyed. When a service 
provider preserves account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) letter, the 
account user is usually not notified. Rather, the service provider simply 
creates a new copy of the information contained in the account and stores 
the new copy separate from the original. As argued above,218 account 
information constitutes property despite its intangible nature. Because a 
user is customarily not notified when a service provider preserves her 
account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) request, the user has not 
consented to the copying of her property nor has she consented to the 
transfer of her property.219 Most users are apt to believe that they are 
capable of destroying their account information should they choose to and 
are likely unaware that a copy of their information has been created and 
exists independent of their control. While a user can still delete the original 
copy of her property, she is unable to destroy the new duplicate of her 
account information, which remains her property. This is a meaningful 
interference with the property of the user because the character of the 
property, after a new copy is created, is profoundly different. Users believe 
they are not only capable of excluding others from their data but that if 
they were to delete their account information, their data will be destroyed. 
By mandating a copy, the government, through its agents, has infringed 
upon the users’ right to exclude others and destroy their own property. 
Because the government has directed a procedure that deprives a user of 
control over her data, it has meaningfully interfered with that user’s 
possessory interest in her property. 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. See discussion supra Section III.B.5.a. 
 219. Some may argue that the law enforcement provision in Terms of Service (TOS) inform 
users that service providers will comply with valid law enforcement requests and that, by agreeing to 
the TOS, the user has consented. However, as argued previously, users often do not read the TOS and 
their agreement to use the service is not always equated with consent to its terms. 
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d. Service Providers Become Government Agents When Preserving 
Account Information Pursuant to a Preservation Request 
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment proscribes 
only government action.220 It does not apply to a search or seizure, even 
an arbitrary one, if performed by a private entity.221 The Fourth 
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures “if the private 
party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government.”222 When the 
government compels a service provider to copy account information 
pursuant to a § 2703(f) letter, it is directing the private entity, thereby 
making the service provider an agent of the government. 
To determine if a private party is an instrument of the government, 
courts examine two factors: (1) whether the government knew of and 
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the private party 
intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further its own ends 
through its actions.223 Both prongs must be satisfied in order for private 
conduct to become a government action.224 When the government compels 
a service provider to preserve account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) 
request, the government clearly instigates the preservation and knows and 
acquiesces to the conduct—i.e., the copying of the records and  
other evidence in the service provider’s possession. Moreover, the 
performing party, the service provider in this scenario, copies account 
information pursuant to the government’s demand to assist law 
enforcement and not for its own purposes. Since both prongs are satisfied, 
the private search becomes a government search, and service providers 
serve as government agents. 
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e. Preservation of Account Information Violates the Fourth Amendment 
When the government requires a service provider to preserve records 
and other evidence in a user’s account, the ensuing copying of the account 
information without a warrant, subpoena, or (d) order is tantamount to an 
unreasonable seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment. 
A seizure involves some meaningful interference by the government, 
or its agent(s), with an individual’s possessory interest in her property. 
Because service providers involved in preserving account information 
pursuant to “f” letters are acting at the behest of the government to further 
a law enforcement objective, they are agents of the government. The law 
enforcement objective in issuing a § 2703(f) letter is to preserve records 
and other evidence in a user’s account pending legal process. To comply 
with this demand, a service provider must make an exact copy of all the 
information contained in a user’s account in the service provider’s 
possession. The “records and other evidence” preserved comprise of data 
created by the user. Although intangible, this data nonetheless constitutes 
digital assets or property and falls within the meaning of “effects” as 
described and protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Because account information is property, users have certain rights 
related to such digital assets. These rights include the right to exert control 
over this property, which includes the ability to exclude others from 
accessing the data, as well as transfer or destroy the data. It is nearly 
universally mandatory to protect user accounts with login credentials. The 
purpose of such access controls is to exclude others from accessing the 
account information. When a user protects her account with access 
controls, she is exhibiting a desire to exclude others from her property. 
Further, users often believe they can dispose of their data at will. In fact, 
certain platforms’ ephemeral services are precisely the reason users utilize 
such service. 
For instance, Snapchat, Wickr, or Confide are services that provide 
self-destructing messages. These platforms advertise that they enable 
users to share content that will be automatically destroyed within a 
particular time after the content is received. When a service provider 
copies all account information pursuant to a preservation request, that 
provider—acting as an instrument of the government—is profoundly 
changing the nature of the property. In other words, the user believes that 
her digital assets will be destroyed either within a set time limit or when 
she chooses to dispose of the data. Yet, even if the original data is deleted, 
a copy of the digital assets will continue to exist, thereby fundamentally 
altering the transient nature of the property. Because a user is no longer 
able to delete her messages and an exact copy of the data remains for the 
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government to use, the government has meaningfully interfered with the 
user’s possessory interest in her property. 
The warrantless seizure of account information pursuant to a 
§ 2703(f) letter is unreasonable. The government may seize property 
without a search warrant under certain circumstances. If the government 
has probable cause to seize property, a case-specific exigency that requires 
immediate police action exists, the seizure is temporary and proportional 
to the nature of the exigency, and the government makes reasonable efforts 
to obtain a warrant, then a warrantless seizure may be deemed 
reasonable.225 As argued above, the government often lacks probable 
cause when submitting preservation requests and merely hopes that the 
preserved accounts contain potentially incriminating evidence. Further, 
the data shows that the government often does not obtain legal process and 
return to the service provider for the preserved information. This not only 
demonstrates that a case-specific exigency does not exist but also that the 
government often fails to make reasonable efforts to obtain a warrant. The 
government’s seizure of all information relating to the account, and any 
associated accounts, is likely overbroad and not proportional. Finally, 
when account information is preserved, it is often not temporary. In some 
cases, the government has copied and preserved account information for 
nine months without obtaining a warrant.226 
Proponents of the existing process for preservation of account 
information may argue that the government is simply copying the 
information pending valid legal process and that neither the government 
nor the service provider search the account until a warrant has been issued. 
Alternatively, the government may argue that it did not take possession of 
the account.227 This argument lacks merit because the Supreme Court has 
found that the Fourth Amendment “protects two types of expectations, one 
involving ‘searches,’ the other ‘seizures.’”228 Accordingly, even when the 
account information is preserved but not reviewed or searched, it 
nonetheless constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.229 Therefore, the preservation of account information by a 
service provider pursuant to a § 2703(f) request is a meaningful 
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interference with the possessory interest of the account user, constitutes a 
seizure, and violates the Fourth Amendment. 
IV. REMEDY AND CONCLUSION 
Part III’s discussion highlights both the value of preservation letters 
as an investigative tool and the legitimate concerns of privacy advocates 
when law enforcement relies on § 2703(f) to preserve both the non-content 
and content information of a user’s account. 
A potential remedy that can balance the needs of the government and 
privacy interests of individuals is to establish a process that enables 
investigators to preserve account information while requiring the 
government to meet a higher threshold when seeking the disclosure of the 
preserved information. As the process for preservation requests currently 
functions, the government requests that a service provider preserve all 
account information for ninety or one hundred eighty days. The 
government can then spend the ensuing ninety or one hundred eighty days 
investigating further, finding a justification for the initial preservation, and 
obtaining a warrant at the conclusion of this preservation period to gain 
access to the content and non-content information. 
The new process should mandate that investigators be aware of facts 
establishing probable cause, or a lower threshold like a (d) order, at the 
time the preservation request was made. Essentially, while investigators 
can request the preservation of account information, they may not compel 
the disclosure of the preserved data without proving to the court that the 
government was aware of the facts establishing the basis for the legal 
process they were seeking at the time investigators submitted the 
preservation request. In other words, if the government requests the 
preservation of evidence and submits a warrant to require the disclosure 
of content and non-content information ninety days later, the government 
must prove to the court that at the time it submitted the “f” letter it had a 
reasonable basis to suspect that an account user had or was committing a 
crime or that evidence of a crime was present in the account to be seized. 
Similarly, if investigators seek the disclosure of information pursuant to a 
(d) order, they must prove to the court that, at the time the preservation 
was made, the government had specific and articulable facts showing there 
were reasonable grounds to believe that the information to be compelled 
was relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. 
This higher threshold makes a preservation request what it should be: 
a mechanism to prevent evidence from being destroyed—evidence that 
investigators can obtain but for the administrative delay of getting legal 
process. Such a remedy would satisfy investigative needs while abating 
the privacy harms suffered by users. 
